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Abstract
Security problems arise from the concern for 
protecting assets from security threats. In a systems 
development process, the security protection of a system 
is specified by security requirements, identified from the 
analysis of the threats to the system. However, as it is 
often not possible to obtain a full system description until 
late in the RE process, a security problem often has to be 
described in the context of a bounded scope, that is, one 
containing only the domains relevant to some part of the 
functionality of the full system. By binding the scope of a 
security problem, it can be described more explicitly and 
precisely, thereby facilitating the identification and 
analysis of threats, which in turn drive the elicitation and 
elaboration of security requirements. In this poster, we 
elaborate on an approach we developed based on abuse 
frames and suggest how it can provide a means for 
structuring and bounding the scope security problems. 
1. Introduction 
Security problems arise when there is a need to protect 
assets from threats. In systems requirements engineering, 
a security problem can be addressed by identifying and 
analysing the threats to a system, and specifying 
appropriate security requirements to counter those threats. 
Our research focuses on the explicit representation of 
security threats to facilitate the analysis of security 
problems. Our general research objectives are: 1) to 
define a precise notion of security threat, 2) to devise an 
appropriate representation for expressing such a threat, 
and 3) to use such representation to structure and bound 
the scope of security problems.
We have previously addressed the first two objectives 
in [3, 4] by proposing the abuse frames technique to 
represent security threats. In this poster, we focus 
specifically on the third objective, and elaborate our 
technique to facilitate the bounding and structuring of 
security problems. 
The abuse frames technique adopts the concepts and 
notation of problem frames [2] for two reasons. First, the 
problem frame notation extends on the context diagram 
notation, providing a convenient means of describing a 
system context in terms of the domains and their 
interactions in the system. Second, the classification of 
elementary problem frames provides a granularity of 
problem descriptions that allows the subproblems of a 
system development problem to be structured and 
analysed individually. 
2. Abuse Frames and Terminology
In contrast to problem frames, abuse frames consider 
threats to a system from the viewpoint of a malicious 
user. We define a threat to be the potential for use of 
domains in the system to cause harm. An attack is defined 
as a realisation of a threat.  
In [1], we introduced the notion of anti-requirements
(AR) to represent the requirements of users with 
malicious intent. We incorporate anti-requirements into 
abuse frames to represent a security threat [3, 4]. Figure 1 
is one generic structure of an abuse frame. 
Figure 1: A generic abuse frame diagram.
The plain rectangles represent problem domains. The 
Asset domain is the domain under attack. The Machine
domain, which is represented by the rectangle with two 
vertical stripes, acts as the interface between the 
malicious user and the Asset. The Malicious User domain 
represents the domain that is imposing the threat. 
Phenomena shared between two domains are represented 
by an annotated line connecting the two domains. The 
problem context represents a projection of the system, 
which can be the whole or a part of the system that is 
under attack 
The anti-requirement, AR, indicated by the dashed 
oval, specifies the observable and undesirable phenomena   
E1 in the Asset domain as the result of E2. The interface 
of the Machine describes the relation between the E3 of 
the Malicious User and the E2 of the Asset that, in 
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Asset domains, will satisfy the anti-requirement. In cases 
where the threat is realised without the active 
participation of a malicious user, the malicious user 
domain may be omitted in the diagram. 
3. Bounding the Scope of Security Problems
 Consider the example problem of developing a traffic 
light system as discussed in [2]. The problem can be 
decomposed into two subproblems: the traffic light 
controller and the light regime editor. Each subproblem is 
concerned with a different aspect of functionality of the 
traffic light system, and each can be represented by a 
problem frame and analysed separately. 
 The light controller is directly connected to the traffic 
light units; its purpose is to cause the light units to show 
light signals in compliance with a predefined light 
regime. The threat to this subproblem can be represented 
by an abuse frame. As an example, one potential anti-
requirement to the light controller is to cause the light 
units to follow an incorrect light sequence (Figure 2). 
a: Lights Controller sends signals to control the Light Units. 
b: The Light Units showing Stop and Go. 
Figure 2: An abuse frame bounding the scope of light 
controller subproblem. 
 The anti-requirement, undesirable light sequences,
specifies the undesirable behaviour of the Light Units. The 
scope of threat analysis for this subproblem is defined by 
the abuse frame, and includes only the Light Controller
and the Light Units. The threat analysis is concerned with 
the evaluation of the security properties of the lights 
controller subproblem with respect to the satisfaction of 
the anti-requirement. It has to show whether the threat 
can be realised (i.e., the anti-requirements is satisfied) 
through some form of attack. 
 On the other hand, suppose that we would like to 
analyse the security properties of the light regime editor 
first because the requirements for the light controller are 
still being elaborated. 
 The light regime editor allows the traffic light 
operator to edit the light sequence described in the light 
regime. Figure 3 shows potential security threat to this 
subproblem. The Operator is assumed to be malicious and 
the anti-requirement, unauthorised editing, specifies the 
unauthorised modification of the light regime. This abuse 
frame defines the scope of threat analysis for this 
subproblem. The scope includes only the Regime Editor, 
Lights Regime, and the Operator domains, and no 
references to other subproblems are made. The threat 
analysis conducted using this abuse frame is concerned 
with the evaluation of the security properties of the lights 
regime editor subproblem with respect to the 
unauthorised editing by a malicious operator. 
c: Editing commands entered by the Operator. 
d: The edit operations performed by the Regime Editor. 
e: The effects of the edits on the Light Regime. 
Figure 3: An abuse frame bounding the scope of the 
light regime editor subproblem. 
Figure 4 shows the traffic light system that is obtained 
by composing the two subproblems through the Light 
Regime domain. The two anti-requirements identified 
previously are also shown in the diagram. 
Figure 4: An abuse frame describing two security 
problems in a traffic light system.
The large dotted rectangles indicate the scope of threat 
analysis for each subproblem. Because each scope 
includes only the domains relevant to the respective 
subproblem, separation of concerns in describing the 
security problem in each subproblem is achieved. The 
security problems identified in each subproblem can be 
represented individually for threat analysis during the 
elaboration of systems requirements. 
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